sink the 
In late April 1982, while
British nuclear submarines took place in the South Atlantic
, there was an intense debate on ways to neutralize
the main threat in Argentina:
the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo. The submarine HMS Splendid
was able to do so. But the Rule of Engagement 206
stopped him.
SINK THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER
! 235
Naval Center Newsletter Number 817
May / August 2007
Received: 04/04/2007
December 30, 1943. The operators of the Cammell Laird shipyard English
& Co. celebrated the christening of the aircraft carrier HMS Venerable for
the Royal Navy. Arrive in early 1945 to help the Allied war effort in the final stages
the Second World War. Hardly have imagined then
almost forty years later, that same ship would frantically searched for
periscopes of submarines of the Royal Navy to send itself to the ocean floor.
During the Falklands conflict in 1982, the most important threat to British intentions
to recover the islands was the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo, joined the Navy
Argentina in 1969, although by then the ship had suffered over time and difficulties
maintenance. Its air component, Skyhawk fighter jets, planes and helicopters
Tracker anti-submarine, was facing serious problems in their operation
originating from the arms embargo mandated by the U.S. few years earlier.
The challenge for British intelligence was whether the Super Etendard aircraft with Exocet missiles
its deadly, were in operation and whether they could use ARA
May 25 to operate at sea.
After several conflicting reports, the British Joint Intelligence Committee
had come to a conclusion on 19 April: Super Etendard could not be uti-
Alejandro J. Amendolara is
lawyer
Telecommunications Law and researcher
Conflict over the Falkland Islands in 1982.
has published several articles on the performance of the submarine ARA Santa Fe
in
Daily Nation and the magazine Warship World
of Great Britain.
currently preparing the thesis for his MA in History
of War
aspects of the South Atlantic Conflict. 236
analyzed from the carrier but
employ from land bases.
With this, the threat seemed to be reduced. But its planes were still
fighter
A-4 Skyhawk, with a maximum
range of 500 nautical miles, enough to worry
Admiral Sandy Woodward, commander
Task Force
Britannica. Somehow, the British aircraft carrier
be offset.
few days earlier, on April 12, the submarine HMS Spartan
had reached
waters near Port Stanley, after 11 days
navigation from its base in Scotland. With their arrival
became effective Maritime Exclusion Zone
(ZEM), announced by the British
April 9, consisting of
a circle of 200 nautical miles
radio from a point located approximately in the center
of the islands. But this rule only applied to
Argentine vessels. This
restriction would be "without prejudice
the UK to take any additional
as required
exercising its right to self-defense,
the terms of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations' endorsement
accompanying the
ZEM announcement. Two days later
-14 April-
commander of HMS Splendid, Commander Roger Lane-Nott
sent a message to Northwood (1)
announcing that he was in position between the islands and the mainland. Shortly later ordered
go further north to locate the ARA 25 de Mayo.
The Royal Navy pressured the War Cabinet to have rules of engagement (2) more flexible
. Nuclear submarines (SSN) could not attack ships
surface unless it was in self defense, but conventional submarines were detected. The
War Cabinet met on the morning of April 22 and argued that if it was decided to intercept
carrier group with one of the submarines, the latter would take about 36 hours
to reach estimated position. Then, it was felt that it could not ordered an attack on the USS
with existing rules of engagement did not make sense to use a SSN
exploration only.
Nevertheless, on 23 April, detected the aircraft carrier HMS Splendid sailing southward
few miles of the coast from its base in Puerto Belgrano. As the submarine was too far from the
ZEM could not attack him. Immediately sent a message to
get the change in the Rules of Engagement and thus attack the ship. Upon receipt of your order
rejection, the commander of the submarine recalls: "It was a
extremely frustrating. I really thought I had. " HMS Splendid had to leave the contact.
that day sent a message of warning to the Argentine government
widely publicized in the media: The Government of His Majesty wishes to make clear that any approach
by Argentine warships, including submarines, auxiliary vessels or military aircraft
that may threaten and interfere with the mission of the
Sink the aircraft carrier! Home
English newspaper The Sun, 17
April 1982 announcing that the
aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo led
Argentina fleet to intercept ships
Task Force British.
(Collection of the author)
(1) Barracks
British Armed Forces for planning and conducting military operations
overseas.
(2)
Rules of Engagement: Directives issued by the authority
political / military
competent
determine the circumstances and limitations under which forces
own start and / or continue fighting
other opposing forces. British forces
in the South Atlantic, is
face an appropriate response.
Given the proximity of the Task Force to the Falklands
and
new intelligence reports, the 24 was ordered back to HMS Splendid
perform exploration and
prepare for offensive action against the carrier.
April 26, at the height of Comodoro Rivadavia, HMS Splendid
sighted two destroyers
Argentine ARA ARA
Hercules and the Holy Trinity, sailing
southward along the coast of Argentina, accompanied
of three frigates armed with Exocet missiles.
After a chase of 24 hours, inexplicably received
ordered to stop the persecution
to fetch the carrier
further north. "I could not understand why
wanted
I stay away from the guards, when in the normal course
-by definition-
the carrier was to meet with them or vice versa," said Lane-Nott.
That same day he appeared at Chequers (3) the need to prepare
specifically an attack on the aircraft carrier.
All ministers agreed that it was essential to protect
amphibious landing force
at the time of maximum danger. The
first step was the closure of the runway of Puerto
Argentina to prevent any aircraft could interfere with a landing. The ARA
May 25 would then be relegated to a fine second step.
At that meeting Cabinet War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Henry Leach,
warned that British air defenses could be greatly expanded
not neutralize the carrier. John Nott, Defence Secretary, is worried about the "terrible logic"
saw the attack on the airport as a move after that. William Whitelaw, Home Secretary
, wondered whether the public was ready for
sinking an aircraft carrier. While the First Minister, Margaret Thatcher, had a vision that would be more acceptable
attacks on airfields, which could be interpreted as threatening
civilians. While Leach shared the position, insisted that it was essential
cancel the carrier for the safety of the amphibious force, and needed
do so no later than May 3. Is assumed to be a very important decision to take
at the time, so a further meeting should submit Nott
the appropriate rules of engagement if it was necessary to attack the aircraft carriers, and
on the possibility of a warning the Argentine government.
was essential for the safety of the British Task Force
preventive measures be taken to neutralize an attack. The next day -27 April-
Lewin proposed a draft that included: the nature, extent and timing of the threat posed by the aircraft carrier;
operations available to the Commander of the Task Force to protect
amphibious force; induce the implications of the threat, either authorizing preemptive strikes or declaring
special areas, the advantages and disadvantages of giving a warning
British intentions, and action to take concerning the survivors of a possible attack. BCN 817 237
Home English daily Daily Mirror
of April 5, 1982,
showing the aircraft carrier ARA 25 May and HMS Invincible
as ships "in
collision course for war."
(Collection of the author)
(3) Picnic Private
British Prime Minister
located southeast of Aylesbury,
Buckighamshire.
Then came the most critical issue: the Rule of Engagement
206.
Under this rule, delegated authority to assume
's attack an enemy unit
was the first of a series of coordinated attacks on multiple
. Thus, it could attack
all "units threatening" to reduce the possible risk
on the Task Force. The
scope of "unit threatening"
may vary, but in almost all cases
included the aircraft carrier. But
-rule appeared to be enough
only apply to aircraft or ships of the Royal Navy
, not submarines.
the 28th, the War Cabinet
received a report describing the threat of ARA
May 25: The Argentines have a carrier
old. Anyway, it can take 7 to 9
Skyhawks and possibly up to 5
Super Etendard aircraft. Both types
aircraft have the capacity to mount attacks
air-surface and air-air
a distance of 400 miles of the carrier. Tracker
The 6 aircraft can perform surveillance operations
up to 500 miles
the carrier, giving it the ability to lead others
air or naval units
into attack positions, like offensive
use in their own planes.
The best defense was to "neutralize" offshore
attacking wherever he was. But while the attack on the high seas provided
the "most economical and accurate perspective to neutralize the threat," the Defense Ministry acknowledged that it would be difficult
to establish the "legal basis for such action, and the reaction
this could be harmful." The recommendation was for the decision to sink the aircraft carrier
once a unit to attack Argentina.
That same day, with the imposition of the Total Exclusion Zone (ZET), there were new
Rules of Engagement. ZET were divided into four quadrants and ordered to patrol
three submarines in the area. No submarine could enter the areas assigned to
the other, unless it was in "hot pursuit" of an enemy ship.
the afternoon of April 30, the Cabinet met again War, this time with a legal advisor
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said any threat
should be demonstrable. I could only use force if the carrier was close enough to mount
an airstrike. The Chief of Defence Staff, Sir Terence Lewin,
whose vision was close to that of Leach, as a worst case argued that the carrier
could cover 500 miles in a day and also had aircraft with an operational radius of 500 miles
, which would always be in a position to threaten the Task Force.
"We had some difficulty in persuading ministers on 25 May was a ship with guns
250-mile range, "Lewin wrote later. Thus, the Cabinet considered that the warning would be sufficient
open April 23 for the Argentine
not interfere with the mission of the Task Force, which Lewin's vision prevailed.
Thus, the War Cabinet decided to change the Rules of Engagement for per-
238 Sink the aircraft carrier! Home
British newspaper The Sun on April 16, 1982
, with the headline
"Here comes the enemy," with expressions
British Ministry of Defense on "
evidence suggesting that the fleet
Argentina sailing south. "
(Collection of the author)
Mitire all
aircraft carrier attack forces off the
ZET-including nuclear submarines, "even if it had not been a previous attack
on
Task Force, except it was the north
of parallel 35 ° S and west of longitude 48 ° W
(triangle with
coast of Uruguay), or within 12 miles of the coast
Argentina.
Nott said later that "we had already given
Admiral Woodward
rules of engagement, allowing the carrier to attack Argentine
May 25
wherever you are, inside or outside
any exclusion zone. " If
the carrier was detected, would cast their lot
.
Early on the morning of May 1,
received a new intelligence report on the position
ARA
25 May, making
from Northwood Headquarters issued a radio message to Splendid
and
Spartan to find the carrier. For
communications problems, the Splendid
not receive the message immediately. For his
hand, while the Spartan received the message,
commander, Commander James B.
Taylor assumed that the carrier is
found on the dial of Splendid,
with is inhibited
address the estimated position. The Argentine-carrier without knowing it slipped away again.
In the absence of news about the carrier's position, Woodward ordered his aircraft
try the search. At 0330 am on May 2
off one of the Sea Harrier, piloted by Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer, 801 Squadron aboard HMS Invincible
, who, 200 miles northwest of the Task Force had
met their radar what appeared to be the ARA 25 de Mayo and its escort ships, returning hastily
the carrier. Then, Woodward concluded, rightly, "
the aircraft carrier group was planning an attack at dawn. In fact, in the May 25 ARA
aircraft were being readied for an attack at dawn, "although
mission was canceled shortly thereafter and the ship and its escorts put forward to the continent. But
this was only half the problem.
The group cruiser ARA General Belgrano which was approaching from the southwest was the other half of the threat
. The only option presented to the British was to eliminate a
from the arms of the clip. The choice fell on the cruise,
quietly pursued by the submarine HMS Conqueror, commanded by Commander Chris Wreford-Brown. Woodward
remarked: "I am bound to say that if even the Spartan
had been in contact with the May 25, have recommended in the most emphatic way possible attack
both that night."
same day 2, at an informal meeting at Chequers of most members of the OD
(SA) (4), following a previous review of the situation by the Chiefs of Staff,
the rules were changed to "allow attack on any naval vessel on the high
Argentina 817 239 NCB
Submarine HMS Splendid (S106) of the Swiftsure class
,
launched in October 1979. Autographed Photo
Cdr. RC Lane-Nott.
The submarine sailed from Faslane base
south
on 1 April 1982.
(Collection of the author)
(4)
OD (SA):
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, Subcommittee on the South Atlantic
and
Falkland Islands.
sea ", as the April 30
had agreed only to the ARA 25 de Mayo. The fate of the Belgrano was
well sealed.
"There was a clear military threat which
could not ignore without sinning
irresponsibility," said Thatcher. "It was
one of the easiest decisions
throughout the war," said Nott. The
decision came just two hours before the start
in Washington
meeting between Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, and Alexander Haig, who presented a proposal that the Peruvian peace
.
the evening of May 2 the threat was over. Concerns about the effectiveness of
nuclear submarines had been realized. Argentina Sea Fleet
retreated to shallow water, without being present in the rest of the conflict other
favorable opportunity for a new decisive attack. ARA 25 de Mayo, with problems of propulsion,
was to shelter in shallow water, but not before landing its component
air to continue the struggle from land bases.
The answer came two days later, but from the air, and the victim would be the British destroyer HMS Sheffield
. BIBLIOGRAPHY
n n The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. II, by Sir Lawrence Freeman, Routledge, London, 2005. N
We Come Unseen by JIM RING, John Murray Publishers, London, 2001.
n The Silent Service, by JOHN PARKER, Headline, London, 2001.
n Downing Street Years, Margaret Thatcher, Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1994.
n Here Today, Gone Tomorrow, by Sir John Nott, Politico's Publishing, London, 2002. Lewin
n of Greenwich, by RICHARD HILL, Cassell & Co., London, 2000.
n The Hundred Days, by SANDY WOODWARD, Editorial Sudamericana, 1992.
